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The beat

Standing at the intersection

Living and working at the crossroads of Ukraine and Israel changes how you read the map. For years, foreign-policy circles treated Eastern Europe and the Middle East as separate theaters, run by different desks and read by different specialists. On the ground in Kyiv and Tel Aviv, that division stopped making sense a long time ago. The same Iranian-designed drones hit Ukrainian infrastructure at night and threaten Israeli cities. The same diplomatic cover, weapons pipelines, and sanctions-evasion networks bind Moscow and Tehran into one alliance that reinforces itself.

Columns for the Middle East Forum, Atlantic Council UkraineAlert, BeSheva, the Jerusalem Post, and the Washington Examiner. A newsroom or an organization can book a call or a consultation on the same file.

Leonid Baratz at the lectern in the Office of the President of Israel
Office of the President of Israel. Distinct from the Russian actor Leonid Barats.

What the two fronts have in common

This work grew out of watching both societies absorb the cost of that axis in real time. It also draws on the scholars, negotiators, and forensic researchers who spent decades mapping how Russia and Iran operate, long before the partnership was front-page news.

I am not a think-tank chair. I moved from columns to analysis because of the people below. Daily reporting does not replace years of archival and policy work. Ukraine and Israel are both on the receiving end of the Moscow-Tehran alliance. The job is to connect those two fronts.

The reporting is open-source. Corporate ledgers, flight manifests, patent filings, trade data, AIS gaps, and the Hebrew, Ukrainian, Russian, and Polish version of a claim that has only been checked in English. What gets filed is the designation that was announced, and the transaction that still cleared the next morning.

Where the enforcement actually fails

  1. 01

    Crypto and shadow payment rails

    U.S. Treasury has designated pieces of Russia’s A7 payment network. The pipes are still open. IRGC-linked and Russian actors settle in dollar-pegged tokens through third-country intermediaries, including Kyrgyzstan-licensed exchanges such as TokenSpot and Shelbit. Currency interdiction that stops at the first name on a list does not stop the trade.

  2. 02

    The Caspian maritime and arms corridor

    Freight that cannot fly still crosses the Caspian. The useful designations are not a press release about “Iran and Russia.” They are the arms-carrying hulls, the managers and insurers, the ports that receive them, and the banks that settle ruble–rial trade. Western governments are still not closing that corridor.

  3. 03

    Drone and nuclear-relevant know-how

    Moscow and Tehran do not only swap invoices. They swap industrial method: underground drone lines, patent access, and nuclear-relevant expertise that never touches a sanctioned bank. Iran builds the airframe, Russia upgrades it, and the weapon shows up on a battlefield that is no longer only Ukraine. Conflict Armament Research’s teardown of Western and Asian microelectronics inside Russian-assembled Shaheds is the forensic version of the same story.

  4. 04

    Aviation loopholes

    Export controls and secondary sanctions still leave Russian carriers, Aeroflot, Rossiya, Red Wings, room to keep routes through regional hubs, including Turkey, Israel, Thailand, and Egypt. An inconsistent aviation regime undercuts the policy it is supposed to serve.

A field note, not a fellowship

Two names on this page are bylines. Atlantic Council UkraineAlert and the Middle East Forum published columns by Leonid Baratz. A byline is a freelance article. It is not a fellowship, not a staff job, and not a seat at the Atlantic Council Eurasia Center.

The other names are the standard the reporting is written toward. The Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), the Hudson Institute, CSIS, and the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center have spent years on Russia, Iran, and sanctions. The columns are a dispatch from Kyiv and Jerusalem that their researchers can use: drones, payment rails, the Caspian, and the designation that failed to stop the next shipment. There is no collaboration with FDD, Hudson, or CSIS. None is claimed. If a joint project starts, this page will say “joint project” in those words.

Inspired by

These are the people whose work set the standard: years of scholarship, negotiation, and forensic research, written long before this alliance was obvious.

  • Nicole Grajewski

    Carnegie Endowment

    Russia and Iran: defense alignment, missiles, drones, the partnership from Syria to Ukraine.

  • Hanna Notte

    CNS / CSIS

    Russian policy in the Middle East, arms control, and the limits of military-technical cooperation with Iran.

  • Jim Lamson

    James Martin Center

    Former CIA analyst on Iran–Russia defense procurement, missiles, and proliferation risk.

  • Arkady Mil-Man and Sima Shine

    INSS

    Israeli reading of the strategic, intelligence, and nuclear side of Moscow–Tehran.

  • Nikita Smagin

    Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center

    Political economy and the asymmetry inside the relationship.

  • Behnam Ben Taleblu

    Foundation for Defense of Democracies

    Iranian missiles, drone proliferation to Russia, and what Ukraine does to Iranian doctrine.

  • Abdolrasool Divsallar

    Middle East Institute / UNIDIR

    Iranian security strategy and asymmetric deterrence in the Ukraine-war era.

  • Edward Fishman

    Council on Foreign Relations

    Energy sanctions, price caps, and economic warfare.

  • Richard Nephew

    Columbia, Center on Global Energy Policy

    Sanctions design, enforcement gaps, secondary sanctions.

  • Elina Ribakova

    PIIE / KSE

    Russian macro adaptation, parallel imports, export-control workarounds.

  • Esfandyar Batmanghelidj

    Bourse & Bazaar

    Iranian resilience, non-dollar settlement, the commercial corridor with Russia.

  • Sergey Vakulenko

    Carnegie

    Sanctioned crude, shadow tankers, energy shocks.

  • Tom Keatinge and Gonzalo Saiz

    RUSI

    Illicit finance, enforcement failure, shadow banking, including A7.

  • Jeremy Paner

    Hughes Hubbard & Reed

    Former OFAC investigator on shadow-fleet designations and vessel laundering.

Who produces the underlying record

Circumvention runs on shell companies, AIS spoofing, and dual-use microelectronics. The primary empirical data comes from a handful of labs. I cite them. I do not generate their satellite or battlefield sets.

Organizations that map Iran–Russia sanctions evasion, and what each one measures
OrganizationWhat it measures on this beat
C4ADSOSINT on shell-company ownership, maritime shadow fleets, and illicit procurement.
Conflict Armament ResearchField forensics on dual-use microelectronics pulled from Russian-assembled Shaheds and missiles.
KSE InstituteRussia’s shadow tanker fleet, the oil price cap, and third-country re-export hubs.
United Against Nuclear IranSatellite and AIS tracking of ghost tankers and ship-to-ship transfers of Iranian crude.
Foundation for Defense of DemocraciesIRGC front companies, crypto exchanges, and Russian–Iranian banking bridges.

Where a byline fits

Read the columns beside FDD, the Hudson Institute, CSIS, INSS, RUSI, and the OSINT labs, not instead of them, and not from inside them. The byline covers the gap between a Ukrainian desk, an Israeli security reading, and U.S. secondary sanctions.

Also searched as Leonid Barats, Леонід Барац, Леонид Барац, and לאוניד ברץ. Filed from Jerusalem, Warsaw, and Kyiv. Not Leonid Barats of the Russian stage.